Fancy Play Syndrome
One of the most common mistakes that even the most experienced players make is getting caught up in Fancy Play Syndrome (FPS). FPS is defi ned as playing a hand in an unusual way so as to represent a specifi c hand that you’re not actually holding, and is usually designed to induce a fold from your opponent. Players attempt FPS for various reasons, but usually much too often.
I was in the middle stages of a No Limit Hold’em tournament on PokerStars, and doing well with approximately 100 big blinds. A short-stacked player in early position moved all in for eight big blinds. I held Q-Q and decided to raise, as I did not want to just call and possibly induce several other players to call behind me. I fi gured that twenty big blinds would be enough to isolate, so I reraised to that amount. Surprisingly, a player in late position moved all in for a total of 45 big blinds. Everyone else folded and I’m staring at a pot that now has 75 big blinds in it. It would cost me just 25 big blinds more, giving me a great price of 3:1. Since the worst spot I can be in against the second all-in player is if he has A-A or K-K, making me a 4:1 underdog – and since he might have several other hands such as A-K, J-J, and maybe even some weaker holdings such as 10-10, 9-9, A-Q, etc. – I have to call at this price.
Once I called, I was very surprised, to see that the second all-in player only held Q-8 off-suit. He was guilty of FPS in this instance, because he was foolish enough to think that I would fold in this spot. The basic thought process starts with both of us believing that the shortstack in early position could move in with anything. The late-position opponent then predicts that my reraise represents a medium-strength hand and I’m reraising to prevent the rest of the table from getting involved, which is true to a certain extent. I believe he’s estimating my range as a medium or even a small pair, as well as unpaired hands as weak as A-9 and K-10. I also believe that he didn’t think I could have A-A, K-K or Q-Q in this spot, as he suspects that I would just call or slowplay such strong hands. His FPS thought process is that since I must know that he doesn’t expect me to fold, he therefore must have a huge hand, and that means I can fold my likely medium-strength hand against his “obvious” A-A or K-K, even though I’m getting 3:1 on the call.
If he moves in and I fold, he’ll win twelve big blinds immediately (my raise), but have to put eight big blinds into the pot (to call the shortstack all in) for an immediate profi t of four big blinds. He will then be freerolling for the main pot of 27 big blinds. He knows that the all-in player usually has a better hand than Q-8, but he’s still going to win about 40% of the time against the range of the all-in player. Given that 40% equity, he’s predicted to win an additional eleven big blinds or so from the main pot of 27. It’s not that all of his analysis is incorrect, but it’s an example of FPS where he came up with the scenario where he thought he could win a few chips every time I fold, and occasionally win a lot more when he gets lucky against the shortstack – but this is all based upon him putting me on a hand that I’ll fold.
As mentioned before, the upside potential is he wins on average fi fteen bets when the play works. When the play fails, I have him covered and he goes broke much of the time. The best this player can possibly hope for, given this specifi c situation, is that he is holding two live cards. As it turned out this time, he’s a huge underdog in both the side-pot and the main pot as I couldn’t fold and had him dominated.
Part of the problem with FPS is that you create really hard scenarios to work with and a lot of people aren’t good enough to understand the secret message you are sending. While you’re attempting to lead your opponents down a path to where the light bulb comes on, getting them to fold, they might not get there. And if they’re smart enough to see the secret message you’re trying to send them, they might be just a little smarter still and see through your maneuver and the underlying truth as to what cards you are really holding.
As a general rule, FPS is a losing strategy. But once that fi rst fancy play works out for people, they tend to get addicted to it and use it too much. It simply is more fun to win a pot by subterfuge than by just having the best hand. So it’s not simply using a fancy play that is the syndrome, but overusing such fancy plays. Tread carefully if you head down this path and remember that sometimes it’s better not to get involved in the hand at all.
